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The debate on new public management, together with the shortage of public funds, has had a considerable 
impact  on  public  administration.  Accordingly,  many  governments  have  searched  positive  impacts  on  the 
efficiency,  equity  and  quality  provision  of  public  services  through  increasing  competition  and  active 
participation  of  the  private  sector,  considering  outsourcing  as  the  appropriate  instrument  to  attain  such 
endeavor. However, private involvement in public services provision is controversial. While, on the one hand it 
is touted as a way to increase efficiency and accountability by turning over choices to individuals in the market 
place, on the other hand, some argue that it has the potential to produce considerable fraud and corruption if 
managerial  control  by  the  public  sector  is  weak.  So,  given  this  context,  we  aim  to  assess  the  private 
involvement  in  public  services  in  efficiency  terms,  putting  aside  ideological  considerations.  So,  after  the 
introduction, we present a definition of public goods and we characterize their different types, with particular 
emphasis on “impure” public goods. Section 3, focuses on market failures together with equity considerations 
as the main reasons that configure the role of the public sector in providing impure public goods, as well as on 
the possibility of government failures. Section 4 deals with the benefits and costs of outsourcing in the public 
sector. Section 5 describes the most frequent forms of private sector involvement in the provision of impure 
public goods, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of the different options. Section 6 carries out some 
comments on the need for regulation. Finally, section 7 concludes.  
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Since the end of the 1970s the disenchantment of the public administration has become 
apparent: the dominating view is that the government has changed from the provider of 
public  goods  to  a  tax  burden  for  the  citizens.  The  public  administration  is  regarded  as 
“bureaucratic” in the sense of too big, inefficient and unable to improve (e.g. Heclo, 1981), 
and composed of structures that often develop an independent logic maximizing their own 
survival and growth. Furthermore, government systems and government workers are often 
seen as too slow, too inflexible, too focused on process, and excessively indifferent to results 
(Gurwitt 2000). Partly owing to this disillusionment and partly due to fiscal pressures there 
was a wave of public sector reforms throughout the world, since the 1980s. Many reforms in 
this wave share some characteristics that later have been known as New Public Management 
(NPM). 
NPM  may  be  characterized  as  a  move  away  from  the  standardized  bureaucratic system 
towards greater flexibility, performance measurement, cost cutting (e.g. Hood, 1991; Boston, 
1996), and more focus on results than on procedures (Minouge et al., 1998). This involves 
both a new philosophy of administration and a new pack of tools, which seek to enhance the 
efficiency  of  the  public  sector  and  the  control  that  government  has  over  it.  The  key 
hypothesis in the NPM-reform is that more market orientation in the public sector will lead 
to greater cost-efficiency for governments, without having negative side effects on other 
objectives  and  considerations.  So,  NPM  have  continuously  supported  the  use  of  private 
sector management principles of planning, measurement and evaluation, the empowerment 
of midlevel management and the orientation of organizations to the needs of customers
1.  
As  a  management  philosophy,  NPM  look  for  to  achieve  efficiency  gains  by  applying 
competition,  as  it  is  known  in  the  private  sector,  to  organizations  of  public  sector, 
emphasizing economic and leadership principles. It addresses beneficiaries of public services 
                                                
1 This also implies the implementation of specific performance indicators used in private organizations to create 
a performance-based culture. These indicators when applied in the public sector can function as targets leading 
to better efficiency and effectiveness. As in the private sector, increasing external-related outcomes can have a 
deep impact on internal control mechanisms, as managers and public servants become more responsive to their 
duties and more conscious and dedicated to serve their public customers.   3 
much like customers (another similarity with the private sector) and, likewise, citizens as 
shareholders. Accordingly, NPM seeks to alter the way in which public servants are held 
responsible to the public, assuming that if citizens are aware of the performance of public 
services they will increase the political pressure placed on elected and appointed public 
servants, thereby enhancing both managerial and allocative efficiency in the public sector. 
A great deal of tools advocated by the NPM, and present in this wave of reforms, are forms 
of  private  involvement  in  the  provision  of  public  services.  Among  such  forms  we  find 
different involvement degrees from the complete divestiture of former public services to the 
outsourcing of specific public services by private firms and a particular policy instrument 
known  as  Public-Private  sector  Partnership  (PPP)
2.  Accordingly,  an  important  policy-
question resulting from the NPM debate is in what extent some of the so-called public goods 
can be better supplied by private providers, and if so, under what conditions.  
Given the above considerations, we will analyze the involvement of the private sector in 
providing public goods and services. The remainder of this chapter is as follows. In section 2 
we’ll make a short outline of what “public goods” are and the problems involved in their 
public production and provision, distinguishing their different types and emphasizing some 
examples of “impure” public goods. Section 3, focuses on market failures together with 
equity considerations, as the main reasons that configure the role of the public sector in 
providing impure public goods, as well as on the possibility of government failures. Section 
4 discusses the ‘make’ versus ‘contracting out’ decisions, highlighting benefits and costs of 
outsourcing in the public sector. Section 5 describes the most frequent forms of private 
sector  involvement  in  the  provision  of  public  goods,  as  well  as  the  advantages  and 
disadvantages of the different options. Section 6 carries out some comments on the need of 
regulation and the requirements needed in order to assure an effective regulatory framework. 






                                                
2 For a characterization of PPPs, and an application to the infrastructures sector in developing countries, see 
Pessoa (2008). For a different point of view see Savas (2005).    4 
2. PUBLIC GOODS VS. PRIVATE GOODS 
 
According  to  public economics literature, we  can  distinguish  between  public goods and 
private goods
3. In efficiency terms, the distinction between public goods and private goods is 
based on two characteristics — rivalry in consumption and excludability — rather than in the 
nature of the agent that provides for them. However, those characteristics are not of an 
absolute kind. Depending upon the degree of each characteristic, goods and services can thus 
be classified from the pure public good on one extreme to a pure private good on the other.  
 
Table 1. Private goods vs. public goods 
Characteristics  Rival  Non rival 
Excludable  Pure Private Goods  Exclusion  would  cause 
inefficiency Ex: highway 
Not excludable  “Tragedy of the commons”  “Pure” Public Goods 
 
As  is  apparent  in  table  1,  a  “pure”  public  good  is  a  scientific  term  used  to  describe  a 
hypothetical good that is non-rival in consumption and, simultaneously, has a zero degree of 
exclusion
4. In the real economy, pure public goods don’t exist. The goods that are nearer this 
concept are Defense and Administration of Justice. By contrast, a pure private good is a 
supposed  good  whose  benefits  are  completely  rival  in  consumption  and  which  has 
simultaneously a perfect degree of exclusion. 
Economics teaches that the pricing mechanism of the market secures an optimal allocation of 
resources, if certain conditions are met. For private goods, these conditions are satisfied 
reasonably well over wide areas in the market economy. In these areas, the government 
normally does not have to get itself involved with matters of resource allocation. On the 
other  hand,  there  is  a  wide  consensus  that  the  main  economic  role  of  government  is 
providing “pure” public goods.  
But, in practice, the government does not limit its action to “pure” public goods. The bundle 
of  goods  and  services  provided  by  the public sector is more varied. In fact, goods and 
                                                
3 Although the notion of public goods has a long tradition in economics, going back to Marshall, Pigou and 
Wicksell, it was Paul Samuelson (1954) that first characterized and systematized the concept of public goods 
and the externalities related to them. 
4 Usually, the degree to which a good is excludable is the extent to which the owner of the good can charge a 
fee for its use.   5 
services  are  supplied  by  the  public  sector  because  different  reasons.  On  the  one  hand, 
government offers “pure” public goods, because if it left this function to the private sector 
there  would  be  an  under-production  or  no  production  at  all  –  despite  the  fact  that  a 
significant  demand  exists.  Here  the  reason  is  the  fact  that  private  investors  will  not  be 
forthcoming because there is no way, or there is only an insufficient way in which they will 
be able to appropriate the returns on the investment in the provision of such goods and 
services. But there are also goods that are provided by political decision, and not because of 
its non-rivalry and no excludability. These goods could in theory be produced by the private 
sector although in practice they often are not.  
In fact, as is apparent in table 1 there is a wide variety of intermediate areas between two 
extreme cases in relation to various degrees of non- rivalry and exclusion. A good may be 
rival and not excludable as is the case known by the “Tragedy of the commons”. The classic 
example of such a type of goods is the common land shared by peasants during the pre-
capitalistic era. The cost of one peasant choosing to graze an additional cow on the commons 
is  shared  by  all  of  the  peasants,  but  solely  one  peasant  captures  the  benefit,  with  an 
inefficiently  high  level  of  grazing  as  the  main  result  and  a  potential  devastation  of  the 
common land. 
On the other hand, a good may by non-rival and excludable. For instance, if a road is not 
congested one car may utilize it with no loss of benefit for other cars. However a tollbooth 
may exclude traffic from such road unless payment is made. Likewise, access to a swimming 
pool has the potential of exclusion, but below capacity limits each person admitted may 
consume services without subtracting from the benefits of others. Here the market could be 
applied, but the existence of at least limited non-rivalry indicates that exclusion would cause 
inefficiency in the sense that one individual could be made better off by the consumption of 
the good without fully denying consumption to another.  
So,  although theoretically an  unambiguous line can be drawn between the two types of 
goods  (private  goods  provided  for  adequately  by  the  market  and  public  goods  satisfied 
through  the  government  action),  in  practice  we  need  to  consider  situations  where 
government corrective action is required to secure an allocation of resources that is in line 
with  consumer  preferences.  Certain  goods  are  satisfied  by  the  market,  subject  to  the 
exclusion principle, within the limits of effective demands. But, if they are considered so 
meritorious that their satisfaction ought to be provided for through the government over and   6 
above what is supplied by the market and paid for by private buyers, they become a sort of 
“public” goods. 
This second type of goods provided by public entities is usually referred to as merit goods, 
whose  typical  examples  include  such  services  as  free  education,  free  health  services, 
subsidized  low-cost  housing,  etc
5.  Obviously,  the  satisfaction  of  merit  goods  cannot  be 
explained in the same terms as that of “pure” public goods. The difference is essentially one 
of degree, but this distinction remains of fundamental importance. 
Although  both  are  two  public  goods  in  the  sense  that  the  government  provides  them, 
different principles are applied. Pure public goods in general constitute a special problem 
caused by market failures, but the provision of merit goods, because it involves interference 
with consumer preferences, falls within the scope of consumer autonomy, as private goods 
are satisfied. Public provision for free educational or for free health services are typical cases 
in point. Such services are of direct benefit to the particular pupils or residents, but apart 
from this, everybody enjoys from living in a more educated or healthier community. Thus, 
goods  that  come  into  view  of  society  as  merit  goods  may  include  substantial  positive 
externalities.  
But there is another type of goods and services that we must refer to. This is the case of 
goods and services that are more or less private (in the sense of excludable, appropriable) in 
nature but their provision and fair distribution is viewed as essential to public interest. They 
are associated to capital-intensive projects and they have significant ongoing maintenance 
requirements.  As  the  words  indicate  “public  utilities”  such  as  water  supply,  gas,  and 
electricity  fit  this  last  category  of  goods  probably  best,  but  there  are  plenty  of  other 
examples, like telephone network services, certain modes of transport such as rail, etc. In 
spite of not being generally named as merit goods, usually the government has had a role to 
play in the provision and implementation of these goods and services. 
As a consequence, as shown in Figure 1, both the private sector and the government have an 
overlapping zone from which some goods are provided to the general population. We may 
call  relevant  goods  provided  in  this  area  as  ‘impure  public  goods’.  Most  public  sector 
reforms have occurred in the set of activities that deal with this type of goods. We argue that 
outsourcing must be handled with care if it deals with goods and services included in that 
overlapping zone. 
                                                
5 See Musgrave (1959, pp. 13-14).   7 
 














The above considerations were motivated by the search of efficiency. But there is another 
reason why the distinction between private and public goods using two characteristics is not 
of an absolute kind: the need of equity. Looking at equity, a society might be interested in 
correcting the final allocation  of goods and services as it closely depends on the initial 
distribution of wealth. Therefore the government might want to correct these inequities by a 
policy which directly benefits the poorer part of the population, e.g. providing services at a 
low cost or for free to the poorest part of society.  
Figure 2 clarifies the basic nature of goods in whose provision government is involved, by 
using two criteria: efficiency and equity. Efficiency is taken on the horizontal axis while 
equity corresponds to the vertical axis. It is apparent that goods of type B, usually classified 
as merit goods (v. g., education and health), would be located in the intermediate position, 
between pure public goods (type A), which are provided by the government mainly because 
of market failures, and more rival goods, like telecommunications (type C), whereas the 






                                                
6 Obviously, this classification of goods and services (types A, B and C) has practical purposes in the context of 
this chapter. 
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It is, however, quite arbitrary to draw the frontier between “pure” public goods and merit 
goods, as well as to trace the boundary between merit goods and type C goods, because that 
depends  on  value  judgments.  Consequently,  the  amount  of  goods  provided  for  by  the 
government  is  unclear  in  a  political  process  influenced  by  tradition,  history  and  other 
influences, which entail specific social values. For instance, while the noninterventionist 
tradition that prevails in the US usually claims that merit goods and public utilities must be 
provided for, to a significant amount, by the private sector, the prevalence of social values in 
the North European Countries tends to extend the desirable field of merit goods. 
Goods and services of type C deserve some additional considerations. All type C goods 
include  natural  monopoly  characteristics  arising  from  persistent  economies  of  scale  and 
scope. These characteristics mean that competition is unlikely to develop, or if it develops, it 
will be uneconomic because of the duplication of assets. Although technological advances, 
notably in telecommunications, have reduced some of the natural monopoly characteristics 
in utilities, permitting economic competition in certain areas of service delivery, nevertheless 
each  one  of  the  utilities  retains  some  natural  monopoly  features.  As  a  consequence, 
privatization of these industries, in whole or in part, threatens the introduction of private-
sector monopolies that will exploit their economic power in the market place, leading to 
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privatization consumers may suffer from both no or limited choice of goods and services and 
face monopoly prices.  
It is well established in the economics profession that the (Pareto) efficient amount of output 
in an industry occurs where price equals marginal cost. However, a monopolist produces 
where marginal revenue equals marginal cost and thus produces too little output. It would 
seem  that  regulating  a  monopoly  to  eliminate  the  inefficiency  is  pretty  easy  —  all  the 
regulator has to do is to set price equal to marginal cost, and profit maximization will do the 
rest. But in practice, this analysis leaves out one important aspect of the problem: at such a 
price, the monopolist would make negative profits. 
 













An example of this is shown in Figure 3. Here the minimum point of the average cost (AC) 
curve is to the right of the demand curve, and the intersection of demand and marginal cost 
(MC) lies below the average cost curve. If a natural monopolist operates where price equals 
marginal cost, then it will produce an efficient level of output, YMC . But in spite of being 
efficient the level of output is not profitable. If a regulator sets this level of output, the 
monopolist would prefer to go out of business because it will be unable to cover its costs. If 
it is required to produce an output where price equals average cost, YAC, then it will cover its 
costs, but it will produce too little output relative to the efficient amount. 
PAC 
A 
Demand  MC  AC 
Price 
Output  YAC  YMC
PMC   10 
This  kind  of  situation  often  arises  with  public  utilities.  For  example,  in  an  electricity 
company the technology involves very large fixed costs — creating and maintaining the 
electricity  delivery  wires  —  and  a  very  small  marginal  cost  to providing extra  units of 
electricity — once the wires are laid, it costs very little to drive more electricity down the 
wire. Similarly, a local telephone company involves very large fixed costs for providing the 
wires and switching network, while the marginal costs of an extra unit of telephone service is 
very low. When there are large fixed costs and small marginal costs, one can easily get the 
kind of situation described in Figure 3. Such a situation is referred to as a natural monopoly.  
If allowing a natural monopolist to set the monopoly price is undesirable due to the Pareto 
inefficiency, and since forcing the natural monopoly to produce at the competitive price is 
infeasible due to negative profits, what is the right way? Different countries have adopted 
different approaches. In some countries the government provides the telephone service while 
in others private firms, which are regulated by the government, provide it. Both approaches 
have their advantages and disadvantages.  
For example, let us consider the case of government regulation of a natural monopoly. If the 
regulated firm is to require no subsidy, it must make nonnegative profits, which means it 
must operate on or above the average cost curve. If it is to provide service to all who are 
willing to pay for it, it must also operate on the demand curve. Thus the natural operating 
position for a regulated firm is a point like (PAC, YAC) in Figure 3. Here the firm is selling its 
product at the average cost of production, so it covers its costs, but it is producing too little 
output relative to the efficient level of output.  
Government regulators set the prices that the public utility is allowed to charge. Ideally these 
prices are supposed to be prices that just allow the firm to break even — that is, to produce at 
a point where price equals average costs. The problem facing the regulators is to determine 
just what the true costs of the firm are. Usually there is a public utility commission that 
investigates the costs of the monopoly in an attempt to determine the true average cost and 
then to set a price that will cover costs.  
To end this section some conclusions are mandatory: first, it is obvious that in practice the 
provision  of  goods  and  services  faces  a  diversity  of  situations,  far  from  the  simplistic 
dichotomy between private goods and public goods; second, given the diversity of situations, 
the solutions to inefficiencies are not simple; third, as the case of natural monopolies shows,   11 
even after implementing a reform that relies on higher involvement with the private sector, 
government must retain a role to play. 
 
 
3. MARKET FAILURES AND EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS VS. GOVERNMENT FAILURES 
 
a) The role of the market 
It  is  almost  consensually  accepted  that  the  dynamic  function  of  markets  in  improving 
efficiency  and  innovation  is  the  main  factor  behind  the  superiority  of  decentralized 
economies as compared to the centrally directed economies. The main reason is that the 
market system translates consumer preferences into market demand in a discernible and 
efficient way. The type and amount of goods and services being produced depends on the 
utility they offer to consumers, as compared to the utility that consumers obtain from other 
goods and services that they could purchase for the same cost. On the supply side, there is 
the  assumption  that  when  a  product  is  produced  inefficiently  and  therefore  too  costly, 
competitors that are more efficient can and will (depending on the entry conditions) supply 
the  product  at  lower  prices,  and  the  inefficient  firm  will  either  run  to  produce  more 
efficiently, or in the end it will be driven out of business. In a similar approach, the quality of 
goods and services is likely to be protected by the market-mechanism. If a business fails to 
maintain and increase the quality of its products and services, competitors with a better 
price-quality ratio will force the business to keep up and improve the quality of its products; 
otherwise it will lose customers.  
 
b) Market failures, equity and regulation 
But in spite of the above-mentioned benefits of the market, there are cases when market 
forces cannot secure optimal results, and so we are faced with the problem of how the 
government can  interfere  to obtain a more efficient resource allocation. The role of the 
government can be described as consisting of the following: 
•  Overcoming market failures. Where needs are likely to go unmet because of market 
failure, there is a role for the government to step in. For goods of type A and type B, 
market failure means essentially an under provision, or no provision at all. This can   12 
occur when the social benefits of services exceed the private benefits with a resulting 
sub-optimal provision, which normally calls for government provision. As one example, 
people typically contract sexually-transmitted diseases (STDs) accidentally. By bearing 
some of the cost of detecting and treating STDs, governments confer benefits not just on 
the individuals treated, but also on those who may otherwise be at risk of infection. The 
same  can  be  told  about  vaccination  programs  and  other  forms  of  diseases  control. 
Another example of market failure in developing countries is the education of girls. 
Many families fail to see any benefit from sending girls to school or are averse to give up 
the household labor, or income, they make available. However, as a social investment, 
girls’ education is crucial because it is associated with improved opportunities for them 
to live longer, richer, and more rewarding lives — and with better health and social 
outcomes  for  their  children.  Thus,  by  encouraging  the  education  of  girls,  through 
educational scholarships or consciousness-raising campaigns, governments can benefit 
both girls themselves as well as their families and communities. This example may be 
extended to the health sector, as the welfare of infants depends heavily on the health 
status of the mother. For goods of type C market failures mainly relates to the existence 
of co-ordination malfunctions induced by scale economies. There is the case of external 
economies that arise when a new highway is built or as the size of a telecommunication 
service increases. The market failure is that at a given point in time, current prices may 
not convey the information about prospective expansion that is relevant to attain a lower 
cost of production (Scitovsky, 1954; Chenery, 1960)
7. 
•  Equity. To provide goods B (health care or education) and C in rural areas tends to be 
particularly difficult, and generally unprofitable from a private viewpoint. Not only rural 
populations are often small or dispersed but also private providers are often scarce or 
nonexistent
8. The public sector is best placed to provide a safety net for citizens who 
cannot pay market prices for health or education. However, this can be achieved by 
providing services directly or by creating incentives for the private sector to carry out the 
task.  
                                                
7  Additionally,  the  government  must  deal  with  other  examples  of  market  failures,  such  as  the  problem of 
adverse selection and moral hazard, associated to the privaty run insurance schemes, which leads to an unequal 
coverage of health care services. Private insurers will only include good risks in their schemes. This behavior 
makes risk pooling among a society difficult and leaves the bad risks to the public sector. 
8  Government  clearly  has  a  role  providing  services  here,  but  it  can  also  act  in  other  ways.  It  can  place 
obligations on private providers to provide broader access when they occupy a monopoly position or consider 
subsidizing access to private systems for disadvantaged groups.   13 
•  Regulation.  Implementing  appropriate  regulations  to  ensure  quality  and  controlling 
costs. Consumers will usually act as a force for quality, but only if they have sufficient 
information. Governments can do something as important providers of this information. 
The existence of asymmetrical information is overwhelming in the health sector. When 
drugs are sold in the open market, the manufacturer is usually better informed on the 
efficiency and safety of the drug than the purchaser. To address the described market 
failures  the  government  usually  reacts  doing  something  to  minimize  the  effects  of 
asymmetric information, e.g. the official registration of health professionals and official 
recognition of drug quality. Quite frequently, governments act to put a ceiling on the fees 
private sector providers can charge. This is controversial, as it causes a market distortion, 
and should be done with care. However, restrictions may be necessary where there is 
little competition, no parallel public provision, or where consumers are relatively poorly 
informed about their needs and the quality of the provision. Pharmaceutical cost is an 
area where the potential for excess profits is high, and control may be necessary, but in 
goods of type C the problem is also real. 
 
c) Government failures 
The above reflections on the role of government have been mainly derived from theoretical 
considerations. In practice, however, some of the aforementioned points have to be equated 
with  the  possibility  of  government  failures.  Some  government  failures  result  from  the 
absence of the corrective function of prices. For private goods, prices not only reflect relative 
supply and demand, but also signal interesting profit opportunities, best practice cost, quality 
and delivery performance, etc. A careful analysis of information from prices is therefore 
important. However, there are two basic conditions for the ‘disciplining’ action of prices to 
function well: transparent and condensed prices and a high degree of competition. The public 
sector has no one of these conditions. 
For public organizations, prices usually do not contain the correct and needed information. 
Since these prices are a result of political regulation, they only partially reflect or do not 
convey at all information on scarcity, utility, quality, and efficiency. Obviously there is a 
cost  price  for  producing  public  goods  and  services.  However,  the  resources  for  the 
production  of  public  goods  and  services  come  from  taxes  that  are  collected  largely 
independently from what they are used for. The allocation of these resources is a matter of 
policy-decisions and the price that consumers of public goods and services pay is often only   14 
slightly related to the actual costs. Furthermore competition is nonexistent, not only owing to 
technical reasons, such as the scale of production or the need of universal access, but mainly 
because of an explicit choice rendering in some cases a “governmental monopoly” structure 
as the most efficient delivery provision. 
Government failures take place both at the supply-side and at the demand-side of public 
goods and services. On the demand side it will be difficult or onerous to determine what the 
real demand for these goods and services is. When calculated, it is generally determined by 
estimations of the needs for public goods and services, in combination with certain political 
values and equity considerations. But, unfortunately it is neither easy nor quick to translate 
these estimations into actual policy implementation. Since there is neither competition nor a 
price mechanism as a disciplining characteristic, on the supply side the production will be 
determined by the allocation of budgets, and so there will be little external incentive to lower 
costs, improve quality, or to satisfy an increasing demand
9. 
There are several ways to deal with these aspects of public failure, but recent public sector 
reforms  rely  almost  exclusively  on  two.  The  first  mode  is  by  privatizing  certain  public 
services forcing them to operate in a market-like way, in reaction to the perception that 
government agencies failed constantly to provide high quality services. For example, Kansas 
privatized its entire child welfare system, in part in response to a widespread sense that under 
the publicly managed system, children were remaining in foster care too long after removal 
from their families (Gurwitt 2000).  
But this first way has been prominent in the utilities (electricity, telecommunications, water, 
etc.) sector. However, to privatize completely these services requires the setting up of a 
sophisticated  regulatory  framework  with  wide-ranging  functions:  avoiding  private 
monopolies
10,  enabling  “fair”  competition  between  the  incumbent  and  new  entrants, 
regulating prices and access provision, securing certain national strategic guarantees, etc. 
The difficulties in liberalizing and privatizing public utilities in most European countries – 
e.g., electricity, telecommunications – illustrate well the fact that a simple transfer from 
public to private provision is generally speaking for an insufficient guarantee for increasing 
efficiency and quality on a long term sustainable basis. 
                                                
9 Of course, there is some intra-public-sector competition. But this competition is about a bigger share of the 
budget, and so it is generally more related to internal politics than to a perceived increase in demand for goods 
and services. 
10 As was theoretically argued above, in section 2.   15 
The  other  way  consists  of  segmenting  functions  of  the  public  services,  distinguishing 
between the ones that by their own characteristics must be dependent on the public sector 
from the others that can be contracted to the private sector. In other words, public bodies 
need to assess their functions according to their relevance to their core values providing for 
them, and contract out all the others
11. The remainder of this chapter deals with this second 
way of solving public failures.  
 
 
4. OUTSOURCING IN PUBLIC SERVICES 
 
The outsourcing of activities formerly done by the public sector was popularized by the 
discussion around the NPM. For the proponents of NPM, outsourcing of public services is 
typically viewed as a way to increase accountability by turning over choices to individuals in 
the  market  place  and,  consequently,  as  a  means  of  maximizing economic efficiency — 
reducing government costs while increasing the scope and quality of service delivery by 
transferring (or “returning”) government functions to the private sector (e.g., Butler, 1985; 
Donahue, 1989). But on the other hand, some scholars argue that it has the potential to 
produce considerable fraud and corruption, if managerial control by the public sector is 
weak
12.  
However, the risks that outsourcing pose to clients and governments need to be equated with 
the  advantages  of  promoting  innovation  through  outsourcing.  Given  that  outsourcing  of 
services  is  more  complicated  than  the  purchase  of  goods,  the  proper  balance  between 
outsourcing and maintaining direct control over program operations (Blank 1999) depends 
on the nature of the service being provided, and on a net benefit to consumers. So, with these 
considerations  in  mind,  governmental  agencies,  as  well  as  private  companies,  need  to 
consider the costs and benefits of contracting out versus in-house provision. Let’s begin with 
the potential benefits of outsourcing. 
 
                                                
11 See Prahalad and Hamel (1990) for a managerial perspective on this subject. 
12 Additionally, there is a fear that outsourcing results in diminishing citizens’ legal rights, as “government 
sovereignty  is  extended  to  private  contractors”  (Wiesniewski,  1991,  p.  378),  and  in  serious  problems  with 
accountability. For example, access can be denied and complaints can be ignored. As we’ll see in next sections, 
regulation can provide some protections against this situation.   16 
a)  Benefits 
The strategic management literature suggests that outsourcing can contribute to competitive 
(or  collaborative)  advantages  in  three  different  ways  (Bovaird,  2004):  first,  providing 
economies of scale in the provision of certain services; second, providing economies of 
scope or the ability to exploit more fully the complementary capabilities and competences 
which exist in the partner organization(s); third, providing opportunities for mutual learning 
between  partners  which  may  be  intended  to  lead  to  a  long-term  dynamic  process  or 
interchange. 
If competition in the private sector exists, we can expect the following benefits: 
•  Improving quality and customer service. Public services are recognized the world over 
for low-standards of customer care. In recent years, many business sectors have been 
revolutionized by a new customer-focus. Private providers must develop their businesses 
and, in most situations, this involves retaining existing customers as well as attracting 
new ones. For this purpose they need to be highly innovative and also to learn from their 
competitors, thus aiding the transmission of best practice. One expects that outsourcing 
in public services can benefit from similar gains.  
•  Investing in research and development. Organizations have great difficulty in learning, 
and they seldom question the underlying basis of their own problems. Especially in the 
public sector, organizations are often depicted as lacking in innovation and intrinsically 
resistant to change, stressing conformity instead of creativity, defending the status quo 
instead of striving for change and improvement. The involvement of the private sector 
can be a stimulus to carry out research and to develop new techniques
13.  
•  Improving management standards. Some  observers argue that because in the private 
sector  the  staff  is  usually  better  paid  and  motivated,  the  management  standards  are 
generally higher and so business can transfer important skills for a great lot of sectors 
including the ones of health and education (Van Slyke, 2003).  
•  Developing new services and market-based systems of rationing. The private sector has 
an essential role where demand is expanding or the patterns of demand are changing. 
When these changes happen, it is an increasingly important provider of higher education, 
for  example.  Skills  development  and  professional  development,  for  instance,  can  be 
                                                
13 Nevertheless, the government must retain an important role in financing basic research that can produce 
important building blocks for subsequent applications that may improve well-being and for which short-run 
commercial gains are not apparent.   17 
funded  privately,  either  directly  at  the  level  of  the  firm  or  through  reimbursement 
mechanisms. It is inevitable that some costly procedures, perhaps of limited efficacy, 
cannot be funded universally. Here the association between the public sector and the 
private sector can be very useful: The government is able to set the context of what is 
considered an essential service available for all. The private sector can control access to 
other services using the price mechanism. 
•  Filling  the  ‘capability  gap’.  Another  reason  for  outsourcing  is  the  need  to  fill  a 
‘capability gap’, that is, contracting out functions where ‘in-house’ capacity is limited. 
This  may  be  particularly  required  for  capabilities  that  are  highly  specialized  as  the 
formation  of  teachers  or  the  management  of  schools.  With  this  regard,  it  is  usually 
argued that contracting-out allows savings on the long-term costs of hiring specialized 
experts, who may be required only in very specific periods of time being under-occupied 
for the rest of the time (Sanger, 2001).  
 
b) Reducing costs  
Alongside  the  above  attributed  benefits,  the  cost  side  of  contracting  out  should  not  be 
overlooked.  Proponents  of  outsourcing  in  public  services  argue  that  contracting  out  is 
synonymous with reducing the size and effects of government. This theory suggests that 
contracting out saves money as the positive pressures of competition force organizations to 
find ways to work more efficiently. It is basically this idea that has motivated State and local 
governments to turn to private providers for a wide range of services, from routine matters 
such  as  road  maintenance  and  garbage  removal  to  sensitive  undertakings  such  as  fire 
protection and the operation of correction facilities (Sclar 2000). 
The positive effects of competition are thought to hold true for competition broadly, not only 
for competition by the private sector or by for-profit corporations. In fact, what matters most 
is the extent of competition rather than simply whether the public or private sector is the 
provider (Kettl 2000; Donahue 1989; Osborne and Gaebler 1992). So, the above argument is 
not valid if the provider is a monopolist, and so the decision about outsourcing must be 
based on a more pragmatic approach: comparing the costs of in house production with the 
costs of outsourcing the service provision. 
Even if we assume the existence of effective competition and well-functioning markets, 
efficiency calls for that the government must be a smart buyer, a skilled purchasing agent,   18 
and a sophisticated examiner of the goods and services it purchases from the private sector. 
All of this is not for free. Although the policymakers tend to consider only the production 
costs, there are many other costs that need to be accounted for.  
First,  contracting  out  will  increase  transaction  costs,  including  both  contracting  and 
monitoring  costs
14.  As  Williamson  (1979)  argues,  given  the  governance  structure  or 
institutional context within which governments transactions are negotiated and executed, the 
contracts  with  program  providers  are  likely  to  be  complex  rather  than  simple.  In  such 
environments,  the  transaction  costs  of  designing,  monitoring  and  enforcing  complex 
contracts are very likely to be high
15. In the light of this, governments must be wary of 
getting caught up with outsourcing processes that compromise the government’s ability to 
secure and protect the public interest in the long term. 
Second, the costs related to the loss of monopsony purchasing power and the social costs 
arising from equity problems (Robinson, 1990; von Otter and Saltman, 1992) could also be 
significant
16. But, these direct costs are not the only ones that must be controlled in the 
public  services  provision.  In  this  specific  sector,  contracting-out  requires  maintaining 
minimum levels of qualified staff in-house in order to specify employment terms clearly and 
in a way that fits the specific purposes of the activity, or to correct the service provided 
externally in the event of provider failure.  
Hence, in the costs point of view contracting out is justified only when one can expect to 
lower  the  sum  of  production  costs  and  the  costs  of  managing  the  relationship  between 
government  and  the  provider  of  goods  and  services  (Globerman  and  Vining,  1996). 
Contracting has a potential for lowering the first set of costs, but these savings could be more 
than offset by increases in governance and transaction costs. Where the complexity of the 
task is high, contestability or market competition is low, and asset specificity — and thus 
investment  risk  —  is  high,  governance  cost  could  prove  to  be  tragically  high  for 
governments.  
                                                
14 See Coase (1960) for the economic framework in the “make vs. buy” decisions, and Donahue (1989) for its 
practical applications. 
15 As argued by Van Slyke (2003), outsourcing supporters seldom acknowledge that contracting out leads to 
additional public management costs such as developing program performance measures and evaluation tools, 
developing and maintaining management capacity to monitor and oversee contractors, and so on.  
16 In addition, some other impacts should be taken into account, too. As Mills (1995) argues, the introduction of 
contracts may both lead to a fragmentation or lack of co-ordination within the broader public service system, 
and could have an impact on staff resources with a drain of key personnel to the for-profit providers.   19 
Because purchase of services is more complicated than acquisition of goods, the former is 
more  frequent  than  the  latter.  Of  course,  there  are  regional  variations:  in  the  USA 
outsourcing is more generalized in public services than in Europe. In the USA it is used for 
all the types of services: direct services, support services, and services delivered to third-
party clients. Local governments outsource direct services such as solid-waste collection, 
street  repair,  street  cleaning,  snow  removal,  and  gardens  maintenance.  The  average 
American city contracts out almost a quarter of its common municipal services to the private 
sector. The average American state contracts out 14 percent of its activities, including the 
operation of some prisons
17. 
 
c) Final assessment 
Research on the quality of outsourcing in public services is very limited, but, like that on 
cost savings, it appears to give mixed results. A number of experts argue that the different 
sectors will have different relative strengths, depending on the primary goals of services 
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). The empirical evidence, limited though it is, suggests that the 
quality of services contracted out might generally be the same or somewhat higher than 
when these services are provided by the public sector
18.  
With a constant quality, if outsourcing is done in the right fashion, it enables governmental 
agencies to benefit from the combined force of specialization and competition, and therefore 
to reduce their costs substantially. The savings provided by adopting outsourcing, seem in 
some  cases  significant.  Overall,  it  has  been  estimated  that  the  benefits  of  competitive 
contracting out may allow reductions in costs by as much as 10-20 percent, at the same time 
as constant quality is maintained
19.  
There has been a lot of experience with government contracting out social service provision 
to private firms, and there is an extensive literature that examines the serious problems with 
doing so (Miller, 2001; Wisniewski, 1991). Looking at the private sector in general, and 
based on the above and on other references (Berman, 1997; Blank, 1999; de Bettignies and 
                                                
17 See Savas (2005) and the references therein. 
18  However,  some experts  note  that  these analyses may be somewhat biased in favor of the private sector 
because public reform often occurs only when public services are particularly ineffective, providing a point of 
comparison that might not be typical of public-sector provision. The results of several research efforts reflect 
this complicated picture of service quality. 
19 See Domberger (1998, p. 163).   20 
Ross,  2004;  USGAO  1997;  Eggers  and  Ng  1993;  Osborne  and  Gaebler  1992),  we  can 
summarize the strengths and weaknesses of contracting out public services (table 2). 
 
Table 2. Pros and cons of contracting out 
Pros  Cons 
Reducing costs for the same level 
of quality 
 
Filling the “capabilities gap” 
 
The  replacement  of  direct, 
hierarchical management structure 
with  contractual  relationships 
between purchasers and providers, 
which will increase: 
Not only the transparency 
of prices 
But also competition, 
 
Which in turn will lead to a gain in 
efficiency. 
•  Private providers respond to the population’s willingness to 
pay for public services. As a result, they will serve those groups 
in the population who are most willing to pay, such as affluent 
urban residents. The result will be increased inequity in access 
and use of public services. 
•  Because of lower willingness to pay, private providers will 
undersupply socially desirable services, such as immunizations 
and  personal  preventive  care.  This  will  worsen  allocative 
efficiency in the corresponding sector. 
•  Driven  by  the  profit  motive,  and  because  they  have 
significant  control  over  demand,  private  providers  will  take 
advantage of clients by supplying more than is required. This is 
particularly significant in health care services. This is inefficient 
and may result in health-weakening actions. 
•  Private  providers  can  also  take  advantage  of  clients  by 
providing  low-quality  services,  which  may  result  in  welfare 
losses. 
The actual effect of these four major worries is as greater as there is 
lack of competition. 
 
As  is  apparent  from  the  analysis  of  table  2,  several factors come into play in reaching 
efficient decisions
20. Factors like the need to fill a “capability gap” or to reduce costs would 
advise the contracting out of some functions. If this is the case, public bodies face the need 
of,  at  least,  maintaining  quality  constant.  Such  decisions  should  be  based  on  the 
identification of the agency’s core functions and consideration of the costs and benefits of 
contracting out versus in-house provision
21. This means that outsourcing in public services 
may not have the result of creating what has been termed the “hollow state” (Bovaird, 2004). 
A ‘hollow state’ is one having the double sin of low capacity and weak legitimacy — the 
latter resulting from, or worsened by, the shrinkage of the governmental core functions. 
                                                
20 Many other concerns have been highlighted along time. McKean and Browning (1975) discuss how and why 
“overlooking any relevant objectives could lead to poor choices”; Grizzle (1985) examines the serious attention 
that  needs  to  be  given  to  selecting  output  measures  in  terms of  multiple  criteria: their  relevance, validity, 
reliability, accuracy, comparability, and cost.  
21 The above considerations about the ‘make vs. contracting-out decision’ in the provision of public goods were 
stylized without considering the level of development of the countries where decisions are taken. However, in a 
developing country context there are other additional problems arising from asymmetry of information. Many 
private providers that deal with the Governments of developing countries come from more developed countries 
with more experience of consumer preferences (Pessoa, 2008).   21 
The main reasons in opposition to outsourcing, and more generally to the private sector 
involvement, can be minimized if there is a competent regulation. However the corrective 
effect of regulation also depends on the specific form of private sector involvement. So in 
the next two sections we’ll deal with these issues, beginning with a review of the typical 
forms of private sector involvement in the public sector and after that, we’ll make some 
considerations about the need of regulation.  
 
 
5. FORMS OF PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN PUBLIC SERVICES 
 
As highlighted in the previous section, the provision of public services has undergone major 
changes in the last two decades with many developed and developing countries choosing to 
move away from the traditional public sector model of service provision and to introduce 
private sector participation. The involvement of the private sector in public services has 
followed, in general, six basic forms ranging from short-term service contracts to divestiture. 
•  Short  term  service  contracts.  In  this  option,  specific  tasks,  usually  everyday 
maintenance jobs, are contracted to the private sector, but overall services management 
remains within the public sector. This type of contracts has been implemented in many 
countries with good records of success and is often seen as a first step towards a more 
definitive collaboration. In order to define the compensation to the private sector partner, 
two  types  of  contract  are  frequent.  In  a  quantity-based  maintenance  contract,  the 
remuneration of the contractor is based on unit prices defined in the contract and the 
quantities  are  measured  on  site.  The  other  type  —  performance-based  maintenance 
contract — is derived from the previous type of arrangement, by shifting the focus from 
administration (maintenance activities and resources) to certain performance conditions 
valued by the users. In this case, the payment is based on a fee directly stated in the 
agreement and linked to performance indicators. 
•  Management contract. A management contract is an arrangement by which a private 
company  is  entrusted  with  various  types  of  tasks  relating  to  the  organization  and 
maintenance operations, usually performed by the public authority. This type of contract 
involves the payment of a fee to the private company. Usually, the function of the private 
firm  is  to  respond  to  day-to-day  routine  maintenance  needs  by  contracting  private 
companies, on behalf of the public entity.   22 
•  Lease. In this form, a private company rents the assets of a utility, and maintains and 
operates them, in return for the right to revenues. 
•  Greenfield  projects.  In  this  option,  very  usual  in  public  works,  the  private  sector 
develops, finances and operates bulk facilities. Under a BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) 
the responsibility of the concessionaire is not limited to the operation and maintenance of 
the infrastructure, but it also includes a component of initial construction, upgrading or 
major road rehabilitation. Massive investment and consequent mobilization of private 
funding sources are therefore required from this company, which is to be repaid from the 
revenue collected from service users (usually tolls). The BOT arrangement stresses the 
responsibility of the private entity during construction and operation of the infrastructure 
and the transfer of the assets to the public entity at the end of the operation period. The 
high  initial  investment  required  from  the  private  sector  and  the  consequent  long 
concession period turn the distribution of risk between the parties into a key element of 
success in such schemes
22. 
•  Concession. In a concession a public entity owns the assets, but it contracts with the 
private  sector  for  operations,  maintenance  and  investment.  For  instance,  a  road 
concession is an arrangement under which, the owner of the road, delegates to a private 
entity (concessionaire) the responsibility for providing and maintaining a specified level 
of service to road users in exchange for the right to collect revenue from those users. 
Besides the issues inherent in a concession agreement, an operation and maintenance 
concession is similar in scope and approach to what is required and negotiated in a 
typical operation and maintenance agreement between private parties under a BOT-type 
arrangement. A concession is more typical for goods of Type C, but there are other cases 
where such an option is applied to goods and services of type A and B: for instance in 
delivering educational services. This was the case of the city of Bogotá, Colombia, in 
1999, which launched an educational program without precedent in the history of the 
country. The program, called Concession Schools, consisted of public education in 25 
schools  provided  by  the  private  sector  for  a  period  of  15  years.  The  public  sector 
provided the infrastructure, selected the students (from income strata 1 and 2), and paid a 
pre-agreed  sum  per  full-time  student  per year (approximately $1,200,000 Colombian 
pesos, according to Villa and Duarte (2004))
23.  
                                                
22 Many variations on this type of contract have been implemented with a consequently growing number of 
acronyms used to label them (BOOT, BOO, BTO, DBO — Design-build-operate). 
23 For details and an assessment of the Colombian Concession program, see Rodriguez (2005).    23 
•  Divestiture: an asset or public enterprise is either partially / totally sold, or shut down. 
Where state-owned enterprises are abundant, the word “denationalization” is frequently 
used instead of divestiture. 
Table 3 shows some illustrative examples and the advantages and drawbacks of the different 
options.  
 




Examples  Pros  Cons 
Service 
contract 
6 months to 2 
years 
Several contracts in the 
water sector of Mexico 
City: i) consumer census, 
mapping the network, 
metering; ii) regularization 
of billing; iii) loss 
detection and reduction. 
Can inject good 
technical expertise 
Unlikely to greatly 
improve performance 
where overall 
management is weak 
Management 
contract  3-5 years 
Waste collection 
in:Caracas, Seoul, 
Bangkok, Jakarta, Lagos 
Gains in managerial 
efficiency 
Gains can be difficult to 
enforce; public entity 
remains responsible for 
investment 
Lease  10 to 15 
years 
Water supply in Guinea 
(Conakry and 16 other 
towns, in 1989) 
Commercial risk 





demanding; public entity 




15 to 30 
years 
Design-build-operate Solid 
Waste in Hong Kong: for 
refuse transfer stations and 
a chemical waste plant. 
Good way of 
getting efficient 
delivery of bulk 
services, with 
private investment 
Not a good solution if 
supporting distribution 
systems are in bad shape, 
or traffic levels are 
uncertain 
Concession  25 to 30 
years 
Water and sewerage 
concession began in 
Manila in 1997; 
Concession schools in 
Colombia, Bogotá, 1999 









but may be 
limited by a 
license 
Privatization of utilities 
like electricity, 
Telecommunications, etc. 





As  is  apparent  from  the  analysis  of  the  table,  if  the  principal  reason  for  private  sector 
participation is the large potential for gains in efficiency in the public sector, it may be 
expected that projects with higher level of private sector involvement deliver more efficiency 
gains. However, the consequent risk of failure grows correspondingly. One the other hand, 
options that yield higher social benefits also tend to demand a higher level of government 
commitment, and also require a better prepared institutional framework.   24 
6. CONDITIONS FOR PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT AND THE NEED OF REGULATION 
 
Both macroeconomic and microeconomic conditions affect the involvement of the private 
sector in the provision of public goods in a specific country. Concerning the macro level, 
political  factors  are  important:  without  an  overall  political  environment  supporting  both 
private for-profit and not-for-profit activities no significant participation of the private sector 
in public goods provision can be established. In countries where civil society and/or the 
private sector are discriminated, the government will remain the dominant supplier of public 
goods and services. Concerning the micro-level, several conditions are also important. First 
of all, there must be an interest and a commitment of some individuals and firms to make the 
involvement happen. If there is an interest and an acceptance of the different partners to be 
involved, then one has to look at the capacities of the different actors. In this respect, we 
have to consider not only the skills of the staff to provide specific services, but also the 
financial availability for an engagement in service provision and the overall organizational 
and management structure.  
Ultimately, the sustainability of the reforms and the ability of the public sector to use money 
more  effectively  in  leveraging  private  money  will  depend  significantly  on  the  political 
commitment to design and carry out effective regulatory policies. Although regulation is 
above all fundamental in divestiture of utilities, it is also important in other forms of private 
involvement on provision of basic public services. Within the framework of NPM reforms, 
in order that the new, privatized market be efficient and equitable, it must be well regulated 
so  that  it  operates  in  ways  that  maximize  social  returns.  Justifications  for  expanded 
outsourcing  of  public  services  clearly  recognize  this:  “Capacity  in  the  government  to 
contract  out  and to regulate  is required”  (World  Bank,  2001, p. 17);  “strengthening  the 
capability of the state to develop and supervise health and education systems is thus critical” 
[and so] “major capacity and institution-building of public sector agencies is required to 
fulfill this role” (World Bank, 2002, p. 18). Accordingly, the need of efficiency calls for the 
existence of independent regulatory bodies. 
So, the main changes in the last two decades in the provision of public services, both in 
developed and developing countries, call for strong and competent economic regulation, in 
order to ensure that the interests of all parties are protected. Such protection is necessary first 
and foremost, to defend the customers’ interests but also those of the public and private   25 
parties to a contract
24. The role of institutions in charge of carrying out regulatory functions 
is even more important in developing countries than in developed ones. In the former, owing 
to several reasons that affect differently the two groups of countries, a much more intrusive 
and demanding form of regulation is required. Besides the reduced educational level of the 
population  and  the  scarcity  of  infrastructures,  which  may  restrict  the  availability  and 
circulation of information, many other reasons affect the effectiveness of the regulation in 
developing countries. However, in developing countries the need for regulation is even more 
vital, because they are usually characterized by non-competitive industry structures and/or 
lack  of  capital  market  discipline. In  such environments, too  little market information is 
revealed  and  information  asymmetries  are  overwhelming.  In  addition,  regulators  in 
developing countries face other specific challenges, when large portions of the customer 
base for infrastructure services are poor and unconnected, tariffs are being kept artificially 
low, baseline information for decisions tends to be limited or unreliable and the regulators 
have  difficulties  in  establishing  their  credibility  and  in  implementing  sound  governance 
arrangements. 
As  already  argued  (Pessoa,  2008),  to  be  effective,  regulators  are  required  to  fill  three 
qualities: competence, this quality being measured by access to technical expertise in a wide 
variety of areas; independence, both  from government interference and from capture by 
service providers and interest groups; and legitimacy, i.e., both long-lasting by existing legal 
principles and practices and being transparent and accountable. Many, if not all, regulators 
lack one or all of the qualities required for effective regulation. These deficiencies can result 
from  different  reasons,  including  limited  resources,  repeated  political  interference  in 
regulatory decisions, difficulty in attracting and retaining competent staff, and short or no 
history of performing regulatory functions. All these deficiencies are particularly apparent in 
the case of countries emerging from social conflict or where the political environment makes 
it difficult to set up any kind of independent institution. 
Where  there  is  lack  of  independence  we  can’t  prospect  either  great  legitimacy  or 
competence. This lack in turn limits the capacity of agencies in charge of regulation to act as 
effective regulators, i.e. to promote adequate levels of investment in the regulated sector 
through the setting of tariffs that recover costs without depriving part of the society from 
                                                
24 Since the beginning of utility reforms in the late 1980s – early 1990s, it is estimated that about 200 regulators 
in  some  130  countries  have  been  granted  the  functions  of  regulating  public  services  such  as 
telecommunications, water, and electricity (World Bank, 2004).   26 
using  the  services,  to  attract  private  investment  and/or  to  monitor  the  public  sector  for 
superior performance. Of course, regulatory functions can also be contracted out, but there 





As it is well known, the role of governments in formerly developed countries started from 
the very limited scope of Adam Smith’s “small government” that provides only defense and 
the administration of justice. However, it is widely acknowledged that the relative share of 
government fiscal activities (in short, the public sector) tended to increase steadily in the 
national  economy  towards  a  big  government.  However,  if  one  looks  at  the  role  of  the 
government’s  performance  in  practice,  one  has  to  recognize  that,  due  to  allocative 
inefficiency,  operational  inefficiency  and  equity  problems,  sometimes  it  poses  more 
problems  than  solutions.  Additionally,  if  public  services  are  provided  for  free  and  are 
accessible, then the quality is often so bad that people prefer to go to a private provider and 
to pay fees with a certain guarantee of a quality treatment. But if people prefer a private 
provider even if they have to pay fees, a question arises: Why not “contracting out”? 
The answer to the above question must take into account that outsourcing services is not so 
easy  as  contracting  out  goods.  This  explains  why  for  instance,  in  education,  there  is 
considerable contracting out to the private sector, for things like building schools or running 
a cafeteria, but these experiences with well-defined school inputs have little to do with the 
core functions of educational public agencies, where outsourcing is much scarcer. 
Given  the  possibility  of  outsourcing,  public  bodies  are  confronted  with  the  decision  of 
whether they should produce a service internally or contract it out. The choice between the 
two options must be founded in an analysis that equates benefits with costs. As argued in 
section 4, it is not easy to compute the total costs associated to outsourcing. Particularly, the 
costs with contracting and regulation are generally overlooked, as well as the need of an 
augmented regulation when outsourcing is extended to another service is usually ignored. 
The design of rules and regulation and their enforcement are crucial in efficiency and equity 
grounds,  where  government  decides  contracting  out  services  or  involves  itself  in  a 
partnership  with  the  private  sector.  If  the  public  interest  is  to  be  secured,  outsourcing   27 
requires that the public sector be equipped with staff with the relevant contract-management 
experience,  policy expertise, negotiation,  bargaining, and mediation skills, oversight and 
inspection  capabilities,  and  the  necessary  communication  and  political  skills  to  manage 
programs  with  third  parties  in  a  complex  political  and  economic  environment.  If  this 
capability exists, outsourcing in public services may not have the result of creating what has 
been  termed  the  ‘hollow  state’  (Bovaird,  2004);  nevertheless,  outsourcing  must  not  be 
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿! ￿" ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿*￿
) ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿￿ ￿ % - ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿. ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ /￿ ￿ /) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ % & ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿% % ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿
￿￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿) ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿￿￿￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿" ￿￿ - ￿ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿" ￿￿ - ￿ % ￿￿
￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
$ % & ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ’ ￿￿ % ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 2 ￿￿3 % ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
( ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿% ￿ ￿￿￿￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿￿ - ￿ ￿￿￿+ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿4 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ - ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ - 5 ￿ ￿ ￿￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿￿￿￿’ ￿# ￿￿, ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿- ￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿- ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿) ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ & ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ - ￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿- ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
) ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿% 6 ￿) ￿ 7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿% / ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ & 2 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿
￿ ￿% 6 ￿) ￿ 7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿- ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿% / ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿) ’ ￿ ( ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ & 2 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿4 ￿ ￿
￿ ￿. ￿￿8 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿" ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ & 2 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿4 ( ￿
: % - ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿￿ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿- ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿2 3 4 3 $
5 6 6 7 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ & 2 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿4 *￿
￿; ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿- ￿8￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿, ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿9 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ # ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿- ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿9 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ # ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ & 2 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿4 0 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿3 ￿ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿: ￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ & 2 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿
: % - ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿￿ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿2 3 4 4 $
5 6 6 7 ￿￿￿" ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿
￿ ￿￿ # ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿) ￿ ￿< ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿= ￿) ￿ ￿ # 2 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿4 4 ￿
￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿% - ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿￿￿￿ # ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
- ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ /￿ ￿ /) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿; ￿￿ ￿￿￿8￿￿￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿8￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ % % ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿; ￿ ￿ ￿￿1￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿= ￿￿￿￿ ￿) ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
> ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
> ￿ ? % ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿% 6 ￿￿ ￿￿ # ￿ ￿￿￿= ￿￿￿￿￿) ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿& ￿￿￿￿? ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿= ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ( ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ - A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ - ; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿￿￿￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿; ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ @ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿ & ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ *￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿￿ ￿ % - ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿ & ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 0 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ - ￿￿+ ￿￿ # ￿ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿. ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ /￿ ￿ /) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿: ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
= ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿ & ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿￿ % ￿ & ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿) ￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
- ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿ & ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ % - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ - ￿% ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿; ￿ ￿ ￿￿1￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿= ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
A & ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 4 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ - 5 ￿ ￿ ￿￿" ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿; ￿ ￿ ￿￿1￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿= ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿B ￿ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ % ￿+ ￿ ￿ - ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
@ & - ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ % % ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿@ & - ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿- ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿@ & - ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿+ ￿ ￿ - ￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿- ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿8￿￿￿￿￿￿￿@ & - ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿( ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿+ ￿ ￿ - ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ % & ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ’ ￿￿ % ￿￿￿￿- ￿8￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿> ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿; ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿@ & - ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿*￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿! ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿: ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿@ & - ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿% ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿% - ￿ ￿< ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿: ￿( ￿￿ ￿B ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿C D ￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿E ￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿& ￿￿F ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿+ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿B ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿@ & - ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ % - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ - ￿% ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿G ￿- ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿ 3 - ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿: ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿H￿- ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% / ￿ ￿￿￿) ￿ 3 - ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿4 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ - ￿￿￿￿ ￿ - 5 ￿ ￿ ￿￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ - 5 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿& ￿ ) * ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
= ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿8￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿- ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿, ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿) ￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
) ￿ 3 - ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿ 3 - ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿- ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿ 3 - ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿1￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿I￿- ￿, ￿￿￿D ￿￿￿￿￿￿- ￿￿￿￿￿C 4 % - ￿￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿’ ￿- 2 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿: ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿’ ￿
" : ￿D ￿ : " : ￿/￿￿ 3 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ & 2 ￿￿ ￿ ￿: & ￿￿ ￿￿￿ & % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿￿ ￿ - E ￿￿￿ ￿ # ￿ % - ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
< ￿ % & ￿￿8 ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿￿) ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ) ￿ , ￿ ￿￿ ￿ % - ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿. ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ /￿ ￿ /) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ # ￿ % - ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿( ￿
￿ ￿￿ # ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿) ￿ ￿< ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ # ￿ % - ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿*￿
￿￿ - ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿3 ￿ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ - ￿￿< ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) & % ( ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ # ￿ % - ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿
￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ % % ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿! ￿￿￿￿
) ￿! ￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ % & ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ’ ￿￿ % ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$9 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿; ￿￿ $
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿8￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿> ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿; ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
" ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿) ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ A % ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ % - ￿ ￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿" ￿- ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿4 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ - ￿F ￿￿ ￿ - 5 ￿ ￿ ￿￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ - 5 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿8￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿= ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿8￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿- ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿, ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
) ￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
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￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿